Reinforcement Learning-based Energy Trading for Microgrids by Xiao, Liang et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
1.
06
28
5v
1 
 [c
s.S
Y]
  1
9 J
an
 20
18
1
Reinforcement Learning-based Energy Trading for
Microgrids
Liang Xiao∗, Xingyu Xiao∗, Canhuang Dai∗, Mugen Peng†, Lichun Wang‡ and H. Vincent Poor§,
∗ Dept. Communication Engineering, Xiamen University, China. Email: lxiao@xmu.edu.cn
† Dept. of Information and Communication Engineering, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications,
China. Email: pmg@bupt.edu.cn
‡ Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering, National Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu, Taiwan. Email:
lichun@cc.nctu.tw
§ Dept. of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ. Email: poor@princeton.edu
Abstract—With the time-varying renewable energy generation
and power demand, microgrids (MGs) exchange energy in smart
grids to reduce their dependence on power plants. In this paper,
we formulate an MG energy trading game, in which each
MG trades energy according to the predicted renewable energy
generation and local energy demand, the current battery level,
and the energy trading history. The Nash equilibrium (NE) of the
game is provided, revealing the conditions under which the local
energy generation satisfies the energy demand of the MG and
providing the performance bound of the energy trading scheme.
We propose a reinforcement learning based MG energy trading
scheme that applies the deep Q-network (DQN) to improve the
utility of the MG for the case with a large number of the
connected MGs. Simulations are performed for the MGs with
wind generation that are aware of the electricity prices and the
historic energy trading, showing that this scheme significantly
reduces the average power plant schedules and improves the
utility of the MG compared with the benchmark strategy.
Index Terms—Energy trading, game theory, reinforcement
learning, smart grids, renewable energy generation.
I. INTRODUCTION
M ICROGRIDS (MGs) as small-scale power supply net-works consist of renewable energy generators (e.g.,
wind turbines and solar panels), local electrical consumers
(e.g., air conditioners), and energy storage devices (e.g., bat-
teries) [1]. Each MG can be aware of the local energy supply,
the demand profile and the energy trading prices with the other
MGs and the connecting power plant [2]. With time-varying
renewable energy production and demand, an MG can sell its
extra energy to the other MGs to reduce the dependence on
the power plant and save the long-distant energy transmission
loss [3].
Each MG can choose the intended amount of the trading
energy with the connected MGs and the power plant based
on its current battery level, the expected renewable energy
generation such as the model proposed in [4], and the energy
trading history, and then negotiate with the other MGs to
determine the actual amount of the trading energy. In this
paper, we formulate the interactions among the connected
MGs and the power plant as an energy trading game. In this
game, an MG has to make a tradeoff between the trading profit
and the energy gain, following the local power demand. We
provide the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game to disclose
how the electricity price, the renewable power production, the
local electricity demand, and the battery level impact on the
energy trading, and the conditions under which the NE exists
to show how an MG can rely on the local energy trading to
satisfy the energy demand.
Reinforcement learning (RL) techniques such as Q-learning
have been used to optimize the MG energy storage and
generation [5]–[9]. The MG energy trading decision in the
repeated game can be formulated as a Markov decision process
(MDP), in which an MG is unaware of the battery levels,
the energy generation and the energy demands of the other
MGs. Therefore, an MG can apply Q-learning to choose the
amount of energy bought or sold with the other MGs and
the power plant without being aware of the energy generation
and demand models of the other MGs. In this scheme, the
decision is made according to the current state that consists of
the predicted renewable power generation and energy demand,
the current battery level, and the quality function or Q function
for each state-strategy pair. Updated according to the iterative
Bellman equation, the Q function provides the expected dis-
counted long-term reward of an MG from an energy trading
decision in a time slot.
To accelerate the learning speed of the Q-learning based
scheme for the case that involves a large number of MGs
and feasible trading strategies, we propose a deep Q-network
(DQN) based MG energy trading scheme. As a deep rein-
forcement learning [10], DQN extracts features from the high-
dimension state-action space in smart grids. This scheme ex-
ploits a deep convolutional neural network (CNN) to estimate
the Q-value for each trading policy. Simulations are performed
for the smart grid that consists of the MGs equipped with
wind turbines, in which the wind speed and the electricity
prices are retrieved from Hong Kong Observation and ISO
New England, respectively, over time, for a given MG battery
capacity. Simulation results show that the DQN-based scheme
reduces the power plant schedules, and increases the average
utility of MGs, compared with the Q-learning based scheme
proposed in [11].
The main contributions of this paper are listed as follows:
• We formulate an MG energy trading game with the MG
energy trading decision made based on battery level, local
demand, renewable energy generation model and energy
2trading history. We provide the conditions under which
an NE exists, showing how an MG can satisfy its local
demand by the renewable energy generation of the local
smart grid.
• We propose a DQN-based MG energy trading scheme in
the dynamic game to reduce the dependence on power
plants and increase the utility of the MG compared with
the benchmark algorithm in [11].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We review
the related work in Section II, and present the system model
in Section III. We formulate an MG energy trading game in
Section IV and propose a DQN-based energy trading scheme
in Section V. We provide simulation results in Section VI and
conclude this work in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Energy trading has attracted significant research attention
recently [12]–[15], and game theory is a powerful tool to
study the energy exchange in [4], [16]–[25]. For example,
the MG energy exchange is formulated in [4] as a Nash
bargaining game, in which the microgrids cooperatively decide
the trading amounts and the prices in the smart grid. The
MG energy trading game based on coalitional game theory
in [16] aims to reduce the long-distant transmission loss. The
auction mechanism can help motivate microgrids to participate
in the energy trading, including the randomized auction based
scheme as designed in [17] and the double-auction based
market as developed in [18]. The prospect theory based MG
energy exchange game as formulated in [19] analyzes the
subjectivity decision of end-users in the energy exchange
under uncertain energy production and demand with dynamic
prices. The energy cheating attack in the energy exchange
game can be suppressed by the reputation mechanism and the
indirect reciprocity principle [20].
Reinforcement learning techniques have been used to opti-
mize the energy storage and generation [5]–[9]. For example,
the Q-learning based storage control scheme has been applied
in [5] to improve the system efficiency of a heterogeneous
smart grid with multiple battery types. The RL-based energy
generation scheme in [6] considers a two-layer Markov model
and chooses whether to participate in the next day power
generation to improve the day-ahead and real-time reliability.
The Q-learning based pricing scheme as presented in [7] can
encourage customers to use electricity more efficiently.
A hotbooting Q-learning based energy trade as presented
in [11] improves the utility of the MG and reduces the
long-distant power transmission loss in the dynamic energy
trading game. Compared with our previous work in [11], we
formulate a stochastic MG energy trading game by considering
the estimation error of the renewable energy generation and
propose a DQN-based energy trading strategy to improve the
trading performance for the case that involves a large number
of MGs. Simulations are performed for smart grids according
to the energy generation and demand data collected from
practical energy systems.
Fig. 1: Energy trading in a smart grid consisting of N con-
nected MGs and a power plant, where MG i that determines
its energy trading intention xi buys or sells |yij | amounts of
energy with MG j or the power plant.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider N MGs that are connected with each other and
a power plant. Each MG is equipped with renewable power
generators, active loads, electricity storage devices, and the
power transmission lines connecting with the other MGs and
the power plant, as shown in Fig. 1. The time horizon of each
day is divided into T equal time slots, with each time slot lasts
24/T hours. A microgrid can receive energy from the other
microgirds, the power plant, and the local energy generators
that exploit wind, photovoltaic, biomass, and tidal energy, and
can observe the battery level, the energy trading prices, and its
current energy production and energy demand in the energy
trading game.
The renewable energy generator such as the wind turbine
supplies local-independent, intermittent and time-varying en-
ergy. The amount of the renewable energy generated by MG
i at time k denoted by g
(k)
i can be estimated via the power
generation history and the modeling method such as [4]. The
estimated amount of the generated power is denoted by gˆ
(k)
i .
The amount of energy that MG i intends to sell to (or
buy from) MG j before the bargaining is denoted by x
(k)
ij ,
and that to trade with the power plant is denoted by x
(k)
ii .
If x
(k)
ij < 0, MG i intends to sell its extra energy to MG
j or the power plant. If x
(k)
ij > 0, MG i aims to buy
energy. The trading strategy of MG i at time k is denoted
by x
(k)
i = [x
(k)
ij ]1≤j≤N ∈X , where X is the MG action set.
As two MGs usually contradicts in the energy trading
decisions, e.g., x
(k)
ij x
(k)
ji > 0, energy trading bargaining has
to be made and the resulting MG trading strategy is denoted
by y
(k)
i = [y
(k)
ij ]1≤j≤N , where y
(k)
ij (or y
(k)
ii ) denotes the
amount of the energy actually trades with MG j (or the power
plant). MG i purchases energy if y
(k)
ij > 0 and sells energy
if y
(k)
ij < 0. We assume that |y
(k)
ij | ≤ C, where C is the
maximum amount of the MG energy exchange between two
MGs. Time index k is omitted, if no confusion incurs. The
actual energy trading between MG i and MG j after the
3bargaining depends on their trading intentions as follows,
yij =


max(xij ,−xji), if xij < 0, xji > 0, ∀ i 6= j
min(xij ,−xji), if xij > 0, xji < 0, ∀ i 6= j∑
1≤j≤N xij −
∑
1≤i6=j≤N yij , if ∀ i = j
0, o.w.
(1)
It is clear that yij + yji = 0, ∀ i 6= j.
Each MG has energy storage devices such as batteries to
charge energy under low load and discharge under high load.
The battery level of MG i, denoted by b
(k)
i is limited by
the storage capacity denoted by B, with 0 < b
(k)
i ≤ B.
According to the demand record at the same time in history,
MG i estimates the amount of the energy demand at time k
denoted by dˆi
(k)
, with 0 ≤ dˆi
(k)
≤ Di, where Di is the peak
energy demand of MG i. The actual amount of the energy
demand is denoted by d
(k)
i . Based on the energy trading, the
local energy generation, and the energy demand, the battery
level of MG i in a smart grid with N MGs is given by
b
(k+1)
i = b
(k)
i + g
(k)
i − d
(k)
i +
N∑
j=1
y
(k)
ij . (2)
The energy gain of MG i, denoted by Gi(b), is defined
as the benefit that the MG obtains from battery level b. It
is obvious that the energy gain is nondecreasing with b, and
G(0) = 0. Note that the logarithmic function is widely used
in economics to model the preference ordering of users and
decision making process [25]. Therefore, we assume that
Gi(b) = βi ln(1 + b), (3)
where the positive coefficient βi represents the importance for
MG i to satisfy the energy demand of the consumers.
To encourage the energy exchange among the MGs, the
local market provides a higher selling price for the MG trading
denoted by ρ
(k)
− and a lower buying price denoted by ρ
(k)
+ ,
compared with the prices offered by the power plant that are
denoted by ξ
(k)
− and ξ
(k)
+ , respectively, i.e., ρ
(k)
− > ξ
(k)
− and
ρ
(k)
+ < ξ
(k)
+ . For simplicity, we define the energy price vector
ρ(k) = [ρ
(k)
− , ρ
(k)
+ , ξ
(k)
− , ξ
(k)
+ ].
IV. STOCHASTIC ENERGY TRADING GAME
The MG energy trading in a smart grid with N connected
MGs and a power plant can be formulated as an energy
trading game consisting of N players. Each MG chooses the
amount of energy to sell to or purchase from the other MGs
and the power plant, xi ∈ X based on the current battery
level, the predicted energy generation model and the local
power demand. The actual trading energy scheme of MG i,
(yi) results from the negotiation based on the energy trading
intention of all the N MGs.
The utility of MG i at time k, denoted by u
(k)
i , depends
on the energy gain and the trading profit. Let y be the actual
energy trading scheme of N MGs after negotiation and I(·)
be an indicator function that equals 1 if the argument is true
and 0 otherwise. We assume that
u
(k)
i (y) =β ln

1 + b(k)i + g(k)i − d(k)i +
N∑
j=1
yj


−
N∑
j 6=i
yj
(
I(yj ≤ 0)ρ
(k)
− + I(yj > 0)ρ
(k)
+
)
− yi
(
I(yi ≤ 0)ξ
(k)
− + I(yi > 0)ξ
(k)
+
)
. (4)
The first term in the right-hand-side (RHS) of (4) is the energy
gain, the second term is the trading profit or payment from
other MGs, and the third term corresponds to that with the
power plant.
In this work, we assume equal energy selling and buying
prices among the MGs, i.e., ρ− = ρ+ = ρ, and that the selling
price is lower than the buying price with the power plant are
ξ− = ρ(1−ε) and ξ+ = ρ(1+ε), where ε is the buying/selling
price ration, with 0 < ε < 1. In this case, we have
ρ = [ρ, ρ, ρ(1− ε), ρ(1 + ε)]. (5)
Denote the NE of the energy trading game with N = 3MGs
by [x∗i ]1≤i≤N = [x
∗
ij ]1≤j≤N . By definition, each MG chooses
its energy trading strategy at the NE state to maximize its own
utility, if the other MGs apply the NE strategy. Therefore, for
any xi ∈X , we have
u1(x
∗
1
,x∗
2
,x∗
3
) ≥ u1(x1,x
∗
2
,x∗
3
) (6)
u2(x
∗
1
,x∗
2
,x∗
3
) ≥ u2(x
∗
1
,x2,x
∗
3
) (7)
u3(x
∗
1
,x∗
2
,x∗
3
) ≥ u3(x
∗
1
,x∗
2
,x3) (8)
We first evaluate the NE of the static energy trading game
with N = 3 microgrids that are connected to a power plant.
Theorem 1: The energy trading game with N = 3 has an
NE given by
x∗
1
=
[
β(3− 2ε)
ρ(1− ε)
− 3−
3∑
i=1
(
b
(k)
i + g
(k)
i − d
(k)
i
)
,
β
ρ
− 1− b
(k)
1 − g
(k)
1 + d
(k)
1 ,
β
ρ
− 1− b
(k)
1 − g
(k)
1 + d
(k)
1
]
(9)
x∗
2
=
[
β
ρ
− 1− b
(k)
2 − g
(k)
2 + d
(k)
2 , 0, 0
]
(10)
x∗
3
=
[
β
ρ
− 1− b
(k)
3 − g
(k)
3 + d
(k)
3 , 0, 0
]
(11)
if
1− ε
3− 2ε
(
3 +
3∑
i=1
(
b
(k)
i + g
(k)
i − d
(k)
i
))
>
β
ρ
>
1 + max
i=2,3
(
b
(k)
i + g
(k)
i − d
(k)
i
)
. (12)
4Proof 1: If (12) holds, we have
u
(k)
1 (x1,x2,x3) = β ln
(
1 + b
(k)
1 + g
(k)
1 − d
(k)
1 + x11
+max(x12,−x21) + max(x13,−x31)
)
− ρ(1 − ε)x11
− ρ
(
max(x12,−x21) + max(x13,−x31)
)
. (13)
If (10) and (11) hold, we have
u
(k)
1
(
x1,x
∗
2,x
∗
3
)
= β ln
(
1 + b
(k)
1 + g
(k)
1 − d
(k)
1 + x11
+ x∗21 + x
∗
31
)
− ρ(1− ε)x11 + ρ(x
∗
21 + x
∗
31), (14)
and then
∂2u
(k)
1
(
x1,x
∗
2,x
∗
3
)
∂x21
 0, (15)
indicating that as ∂u
(k)
1 (x1,x
∗
2,x
∗
3) /∂x1 = 0,
u
(k)
1
(
x1,x
∗
2,x
∗
3
)
≤ u
(k)
1
(
x∗1,x
∗
2,x
∗
3
)
. (16)
Thus, (9) holds for (6). Similarly, we can prove that (7) and
(8) hold indicating that (9)-(11) is the NE of the game.
Corollary 1: If (12) holds, the actual amounts of the energy
that MG 1 sells to the power plant and the other 2 MGs are
β(3− 2ε)/ρ(1− ε)− 3−
∑3
i=1(b
(k)
i + g
(k)
i − d
(k)
i ), −β/ρ+
1 + b
(k)
2 + g
(k)
2 − d
(k)
2 , and −β/ρ + 1 + b
(k)
3 + g
(k)
3 − d
(k)
3 ,
respectively.
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Fig. 2: Average utility of an MG in the energy trading game
consisting of three MGs, with β = 120.
As shown in Fig. 2, the average utility of an MG increases
with the battery capacity and the power selling/buying price
ratio, because the MG can store more electricity in the off-
peak time to improve the profit in the trading.
We now consider a stochastic game denoted by G, in
which the MGs estimate the amount of the renewable energy
generated in the time slot and the maximum estimation error
denoted by △(k) follows the distribution denoted by f given
by
f(g) =


P, g = gˆ
(1− P )/2, g = gˆ −△ or gˆ +△
0, o.w.
. (17)
In other words, the probability of an accurate estimation of
the renewable energy generation is P , and the MG has an
estimation error ±△ with probability (1 − P )/2, where P
denotes the estimation accuracy.
Lemma 1: The stochastic energy trading game G has an NE
given by
x∗1 =
[
3P (1− ε)
2β(1− P )
−
1
1− P
(
P 2 − P +
ρ2(1− ε)2
4β2
)1/2
− 3−
∑
1≤i≤3
(
b
(k)
i + g
(k)
i − d
(k)
i
)
, d
(k)
1 − b
(k)
1
− 1− g
(k)
1 +
1
1− P
((
P 2 − P +
ρ2
4β
)1/2
+
ρ
2β
)
,
1
P − 1
((
P 2 − P +
ρ2
4β
)1/2
−
ρ
2β
)
− 1− b
(k)
1
− g
(k)
1 + d
(k)
1
]
(18)
x∗i =
[
1
1− P
((
P 2 − P +
ρ2
4β2
)1/2
+
ρ
2β
)
− 1− b
(k)
i − g
(k)
i + d
(k)
i , 0, 0
]
, i = 2, 3, (19)
if
3P (1− ε)
2β
−
(
P 2 − P +
ρ2(1− ε)2
4β2
)1/2
≤ (1− P )
(
3 +
∑
1≤i≤3
(
b
(k)
i + g
(k)
i − d
(k)
i
))
(20)
(
P 2 − P +
ρ2
4β2
)1/2
+
ρ
2β
>
(1− P )
(
1 + max
i=2,3
(
b
(k)
i + g
(k)
i − d
(k)
i
))
. (21)
Proof 2: Similar with that to Theorem 1.
V. DQN-BASED ENERGY TRADING SCHEME
The MG trading decision in a dynamic energy trading
game G can be formulated as a Markov decision process,
in which MG i decides the intended amount of the trading
energy denoted by x
(k)
i = [x
(k)
ij ]1≤j≤N , and exchanges such
information with the neighboring N − 1 MGs. Therefore, we
propose a DQN-based energy trading scheme that uses CNN
as a nonlinear function approximator to estimate the quality or
5Fig. 3: DQN-based MG energy trading scheme.
Q value of each feasible energy trading policy and compress
the state space of the MG.
In each time slot, according to the generation model and
historical record, MG i can estimate the local energy demand
dˆ
(k)
i and the renewable energy generation gˆ
(k)
i , and observe the
current battery level b
(k)
i , which are used to formulate the state
denoted by s
(k)
i , with s
(k)
i =
[
dˆ
(k)
i , gˆ
(k)
i , b
(k)
i
]
. The experience
sequence at time k, denoted by ϕ
(k)
i consists of the current
state s
(k)
i , and the previous W state-action pairs, with ϕ
(k)
i =(
s
(k−W )
i ,x
(k−W )
i , · · · ,x
(k−1)
i , s
(k)
i
)
.
MG i chooses the energy trading strategy x
(k)
i in first W
time slots at random, and reshapes the state sequence ϕ
(k)
i
afterwards into a square matrix. The matrix is the input of
the CNN with weights denoted by θ
(k)
i . As shown in Fig. 3,
the CNN consists of two convolutional (Conv) layers and two
fully connected (FC) layers. Similar to [10], the first Conv
layer includes n[1] filters, each with size f [1]× f [1] and stride
s[1], and uses a rectified linear units (ReLU) as an activation
function. The second Conv layer involves n[2] filters, each
with f [2] × f [2] and stride s[2], again followed by a ReLU.
The outputs of Conv 2 are input to two FC layers, which use
n[3] and |X |N rectified linear units respectively, where |X |N
is the number of feasible trading actions for MG i. The output
of the CNN denoted by Q
(
ϕ
(k)
i ,x; θ
(k)
i
)
is the estimated Q-
value for the |X |N trading actions.
According to the ǫ-greedy algorithm by which the scheme
can avoid staying in the local optimum, the MG i chooses
the “optimal” strategy as the intended amount of the trading
energy, x
(k)
i = [x
(k)
ij ]1≤i≤N , that maximizes the Q-value with
a high probability 1 − ǫ, and another strategy with a low
probability ǫ/(|X |N − 1), i. e.,
Pr
(
x
(k)
)
=


1− ǫ, x(k) = arg max
x′∈X
Q
(
ϕ
(k)
i
,x′
)
ǫ
|X|N−1
, o.w.
(22)
The MGs exchange their decision x
(k)
j with 1 ≤ j ≤ N
to calculate the actual amount for the energy trading y
(k)
i via
Eq. (1). If yij > 0 (or yii > 0), MG i purchases yij amount
of energy from MG j (or the power plant), otherwise, sells
−yij amount of energy.
After the energy trade, MG i observes the actual energy
generation g
(k)
i , local demand d
(k)
i and the energy trading price
ρ(k) to evaluate the utility u
(k)
i via Eq. (4).
The DQN-based energy trading scheme stores such en-
ergy trading experience of MG i denoted by e
(k)
i =(
ϕ
(k)
i ,x
(k)
i , u
(k)
i ,ϕ
(k+1)
i
)
in the replay memory pool denoted
by D =
{
e
(1)
i , · · · , e
(k)
i
}
. According to the experience replay,
MG i randomly chooses M experience sequences from D,
denoted by M =
{
e(m)
}
m∈{1,··· ,M}
, where M is the size
of the minibatch. The loss function on the minibatch, i.e., the
mean-squared error of the target optimal Q-value, denoted by
L
(
θ
(k)
i
)
is given by
L
(
θ
(k)
i
)
=EM
[(
ui + γ max
x′∈X
Q
(
ϕ′i,x
′; θ
(k−1)
i
)
−Q
(
ϕi,x; θ
(k)
i
))2]
, (23)
where ϕ′i is the next state sequence, and the discount factor
γ ∈ [0, 1] represents the uncertainty of the future utility.
According to the minibatch gradient descent algorithm given
by [10], the CNN weights θ(k) is updated by minimizing the
loss function L
(
θ
(k)
i
)
, as summarized in Algorithm 1.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
We evaluate the performance of the energy trading strategy
in the smart grid consisting of three interconnected MGs and a
power plant. The simulations are based on the historical wind
speed data collected by Hong Kong Observation, as shown in
6Algorithm 1: DQN-based energy trading strategy
1 Initialize α, γ, W , θ(1), and D = Ø
2 for k = 1, 2, · · · do
3 Estimate energy generation gˆ
(k)
i and demand dˆ
(k)
i
4 Observe battery level b
(k)
i
5 s
(k)
i =
[
dˆ
(k)
i , gˆ
(k)
i , b
(k)
i
]
6 if k ≤W then
7 Choose x
(k)
i ∈ X
N at random
8 else
9 Form experience sequence
ϕ
(k)
i =
(
s
(k−W )
i , s
(k−W+1)
i , · · · , s
(k)
i
)
10 Input ϕ
(k)
i to the CNN with weights θ
(k)
11 Obtain the CNN outputs of ϕ
(k)
i ,
Q
(
ϕ
(k)
i ,x; θ
(k)
i
)
12 Choose x
(k)
i via (22)
13 end
14 Send the intended amount of the energy trading x
(k)
i
15 for j = 1, 2, · · · , N do
16 Receive the intended amount of the energy
trading from the neighboring MGs x
(k)
ji
17 Calculate y
(k)
ij via (1)
18 if j 6= i then
19 if y
(k)
ij < 0 then
20 Sell −y
(k)
ij amount of the energy to MG j
21 else
22 Purchase y
(k)
ij amount of the energy from
MG j
23 end
24 else
25 if y
(k)
ii < 0 then
26 Sell −y
(k)
ii amount of the energy to the
power plant
27 else
28 Purchase y
(k)
ii amount of the energy from
the power plant
29 end
30 end
31 end
32 Observe actual generation g
(k)
i , actual demand d
(k)
i
33 Observe the electricity price ρ(k)
34 Evaluate u
(k)
i via (4)
35 D ← D ∪ e(k)
36 Select M experience sequences from D at random
forming M
37 Calculate L
(
θ(k)
)
via (23)
38 Update the CNN weights with θ(k) by minibatch
gradient descent
39 end
Fig. 4(a), in which each MG applies the wind power generation
model in [26] to predict the renewable power generation in
each hour. In the simulations, the daily power demand of each
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Fig. 4: Supply and demand profiles of MG 1, MG 2 and MG
3.
MG is modeled based on the real historical records published
in [4], as shown in Fig. 4(b), and the MG electricity trading
prices follow the ISO New England record in [27], with the
MG energy trading price changing over time between 0.19
to 0.44 HKD/kWh. The parameters of the DQN-based energy
trading strategy are listed in Table I with β = 120 and T = 6.
The hotbooting Q-learning based trading scheme in [11] are
evaluated in the simulations as a benchmark.
Layer Conv 1 Conv 2 FC 1 FC 2
Input 6× 6 4× 4× 20 360 180
Filter size 3× 3 2× 2 / /
Stride 1 1 / /
# filters 20 40 180 |X|N
Activation ReLU ReLU ReLU /
Output 4× 4× 20 3× 3× 40 180 |X|N
TABLE I: CNN ARCHITECTURE PARAMETERS
As shown in Fig. 5, the DQN-based energy trading scheme
reduces the dependence on the power plant compared with
hotbooting Q. For example, the power plant schedule of the
DQN-based strategy is 24% lower at the night time (8:00
pm-12:00 pm), compared with the benchmark scheme. The
amount of the trading energy with the power plant decreases
with the battery capacity, as MGs can save more energy at the
low electricity price and discharge the extra energy to support
other MGs at the peak load time. For example, this strategy
decreases the average power plant schedule from 83 kWh to
96 kWh as the battery capacity increases from 400 to 600
kWh. The power plant schedule with 600kWh capacity is 25%
lower than the benchmark scheme, as shown in Fig. 5(b). As
shown in Fig. 5(c), the power plant schedule decreases with
the price ratio. For example, this strategy reduces the power
plant schedule by 24% as the price ratio increases from 0.1 to
0.5.
The DQN-based trading strategy improves the utilization of
local renewable energy and increases the average utility of
MGs, as shown in Fig. 6. For instance, this scheme increases
the average utility by 29.7% compared with the benchamark
scheme during 00:00 am-04:00 am. If the battery capacity
changes from 400 kWh to 600 kWh, the average utility of
MGs increases by 22.8%, which is 21.9% higher than the
benchmark strategy. Finally, this strategy increases the average
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Fig. 5: Average amount with the power plant.
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Fig. 6: Average utility of an MG in a smart grid consisting of three MGs, with β = 120.
utility from 162 to 169 as the price ratio 0.1 to 0.5, and
the price ratio is 0.5, which is 13% higher than that of the
benchmark scheme.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have formulated an MG energy trading
game for smart grids and provided the NE of the game,
disclosing the conditions under which a smart grid trade uses
the renewable power generation of the MGs to satisfy the
local power demand. We have proposed a DQN-based energy
trading strategy to achieve the optimal energy trading policy
in the dynamic game without aware of the energy generation
and local demand models of the other MGs. Simulations based
on realistic power generation and demand data demonstrate
the effectiveness of this scheme, showing that this scheme
can reduce the power plant schedule by 12.7% and improve
the utility of MGs by 22.3%, compared with the benchmark
strategy.
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